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WHILE EQUITY SLUMBERED:
CREDITOR ADVANTAGE, A CAPITALIST
LAND MARKET, AND UPPER CANADA'S
MISSING COURT
By JOHN C. WEAVER*
Until 1837, Upper Canada had no Court of Chancery. This omission
forced stop-gap measures which in the area of mortgages produced a
muddle. The confusion introduced into the land market led to protracted
controversies among politicians and jurists during the 1820s and 1830s.
The many complex principles and motives raised by the lack of an
equitable jurisdiction generated much legislative controversy and
experimentation. John Beverley Robinson often was central to vital
discussions where he revealed both his intelligence and social biases
favouring gentlemen of capital. Extremely complicated issues have
deflected attention from the central issue: whether the colony needed
equity, whether it needed to follow English law. The episodes show that
Upper Canadians of many political outlooks were not at all convinced
that their society should embrace English law. Moreover, the neglect of
equity and opposition to it should not be treated just as a demonstration
of frontier circumstances. Social attitudes, personal motives, political
circumstances, and disputes about colonial independence from English
models and Crown influence greatly affected the law. The law as
abstraction and the law as social product clashed quite early in the life
of this society.
Copyright, 1990, John C. Weaver.
* John C. Weaver is Chair and Professor of History at McMaster University and editor
of the Urban History Review. The current article arose from work with geographer Michael
Doucet on a history of land, capital, and shelter in North America. He is looking now at the
history of mortgage lending with a long term comparative study of Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States.
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It could be said that Upper Canadian civil and criminal law,
which has sustained for many years practices significantly distinct
from English law, expressed consideration for the environment.'
True, as an abridgement, this characterization suffers because it
distorts historical processes. By commission, but also by omission,
colonial jurisprudence developed independently, propelled by
members of an administrative and juridical elite who believed that
they might fashion a new constitution convenient to propertied
interests with which they were sympathetic. It was not just
environment - the sum of wilderness and a small public purse - that
affected the character of criminal and civil law. Social structure,
ideologies, and personalities must be taken into consideration.
In analyzing the development of colonial uniqueness, this
paper magnifies only a sliver of civil law; namely, the well-known
omission of an equity court in Upper Canada until 1837, some
significant consequences of that omission, and the circumstances of
its introduction.
It has been assumed that there had been insufficient landed
wealth or economic development in the colony to justify the
establishment of a jurisdiction which had a poor reputation in
England where it was thought to be expensive and slow. In fact,
1 D.H. Flaherty, "Writing Canadian Legal History: An Introduction" in D.H. Flaherty,
ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law vol.1 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1981) 3 at 15.
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there is no documentation to explain why the early governments of
Upper Canada failed to create the court. From time to time, the
home government considered the need for an equity court and
colonial judges and administrators heard complaints about the
inconvenience of the missing jurisdiction. On one occasion, in 1807,
the home government secured an opinion from an authority at the
Temple to the effect that equity had entered the colony in 1792 as
part of the general introduction of English law. Yet, no court was
created. However, a series of alternative provisions did follow, many
of which have been spelled out recently by Elizabeth Brown.
2
The assumption that Upper Canadians wisely refrained from
introducing a widely criticized jurisdiction to their jurisprudence, and
that the alternatives might have sufficed, would constitute whig
history. Not all Upper Canadians felt the colony could get along
without a court of equity. Brown has noted that legislative
substitutions met some needs, but her study did not grapple with
the areas of problematic legislation for which an equitable
jurisdiction readily would have provided. Equity, though it had little
practical substance in the colony, clearly slumbered, and this odd
state precluded any complete sense of settlement of the issue.
Moreover, when the government of Upper Canada finally created a
court, it instituted an important element for the satisfactory
functioning of the mortgage market, and answered a need felt by
more and more Upper Canadians during the maturation of the
economy in the 1830s. John Godfrey Spragge - later an equity
judge - speaking about the court, explained: "[T]he want of an
equitable jurisdiction was very much felt ... it was from no love of a
Court of Chancery that it was introduced, but in spite of many and
strong prejudices."3 It is the struggle hidden between the lines of
this comment which provides the substance of this paper.
It has always been assumed that the reformers were one of
the parties most strongly prejudiced against equity. However, the
politics of equity were far more complicated. In 1825, that sharp-
2 E. Brown, "Equitable Jurisdiction and the Court of Chancery in Upper Canada" (1983)
27 Osgoode Hall LJ. 275 at 278-88.
3 Quoted in J.D. Falconbridge, "Law and Equity in Upper Canada" (1914) 63 U. Pa. L.
Rev. & Am. L Reg. 1 at 14-15. I am indebted to Philip Sworden for this citation.
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tongued opponent of privilege, William Lyon Mackenzie, strongly
urged fellow reformer John Rolph to petition the Crown to establish
chancery: "Full well he knows the extreme deficiency of our law
system, and how it is to cause injustice instead of justice."4 Later,
Mackenzie backed away from this stance and, in exile after the
rebellion, he became a determined enemy of chancery 5 During the
1820s and 1830s, Mackenzie's aberrant demand aside, the reformers
wanted certain equitable benefits without the cost of the Court's
establishment. In Upper Canada, where much remained fluid and
where there were struggles for power and privilege at every turn,
equity was not an issue settled by consensus nor by men taking
consistent stands. Additionally, it will surprise no student of Upper
Canadian history to learn that the equity controversies that flared up
from time to time focused on the relationship between debtor and
creditor interests.
While the importance of equity is manifest when it is
defined, its connection with debtor and creditor relations requires an
explanation. Equity was a strain of English law serving to
supplement and remedy limitations in common law. Equity evolved
from the practice of petitioning the Crown for a remedy unavailable
through the precise and confining mesh of common law. As
petitions were dealt with through the office of the Lord Chancellor,
the Court of Chancery grew to handle petitions and assess the
merits of the petitioners' cases. Appellants who sought relief from
a fraud, for example, or specific performance of a contract that
seemed unfair could look for an action in chancery. Its omission
from the colony's constitution was a serious affair.
W.L. Mackenzie, Colonial Advocate (27 March 1825) 2. I am indebted to George
Sheppard for this citation.
5 The claim that Mackenzie consistently opposed chancery appeared most recently in
J.M. Ferron, 'The Masters" (1988) 22 L. Soc. Gaz. 323 at 324. For his opposition, see L.
Gates, After the Rebellion: The Later Years of William Lyon Mackenzie (Toronto: Dundurn
Press, 1988 ) 175, 182-83.
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I. CREDITOR ADVANTAGE AND COLONIAL
EXCEPTIONALISM
We must now try to specify the injustices and identify the
prejudiced parties. For that, we turn to the beginnings of the
colony. The first Upper Canadian statute, 32 Geo. 3, c. 1, declared
that henceforth, "in all matters of controversy relative to property
and civil rights, resort shall be had to the laws of England, as the
rule for the decision of the same." This statement may have
excluded equity. The plural term "laws" could have been construed
narrowly to mean the common law and statutes. Possibly, the
colonial government sought to bar the English processes that
protected the poor and petty proprietors. This first statute, it
should be added, excluded the English poor laws and bankruptcy
laws. The explicit elimination of the poor laws suggests a desire to
be rid of old country obligations. Further, having banished equity by
a narrow definition of the juridical elements being brought into the
colony, doubts are raised about the statute. After all, if the poor
laws were specifically omitted, then failure to omit equity implies an
introduction of it into Upper Canada. Indeed, this was the position
taken by the home government in 1807. Many nervous mortgagees
made the same assumption. The question of what constituted the
law was not answered forthrightly at the beginning, but there can be
little doubt that equity must have been a part of the colony's laws.
The next major act affecting the civil law signals more clearly
that the colony's legislators wished to rationalize the law. The 1794
Act establishing the judiciary, 34 Geo. 3, c. 3, created only a Chief
Justice and two puisne judges of a Court of King's Bench. No
sources explain the omission of an equitable jurisdiction. It may
have been believed that a few thousand settlers and Amerindians did
not require and could not afford an equitable jurisdiction. If this
were so, it is essential to add that neglect due to expediency created
a situation in mortgage law that favoured creditors. The omission
was not neutral, and to establish that fact, we must introduce the
concept of the equity of the right of redemption.
English law protected debtors against the loss of their land
for the failure to pay an ordinary debt through chancery. Where an
estate in land had been pledged as security, the situation had
1990] 875
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become far more involved. But here too, an important safeguard
worked for debtors. Essentially, a pledge of land for a debt was a
manipulation of common law known as a mortgage. A debtor, the
mortgagor, conveyed his land to the mortgagee outright in fee
simple. However, he also retained by a covenant the right to
resecure the land if the conditions of the covenant were satisfied.
Common law courts appraised these transactions strictly and
unsympathetically as far as the mortgagor was concerned. If the
performance of the conditions in the covenant for reconveyance
were not complied with exactly as spelled out, then the mortgagor
lost those lands affected by the agreement. To miss repayment even
by one day was to lose all.
In the mid-fifteenth century, the Chancellor began to
intervene to protect mortgagors in scandalous cases. By about 1625,
chancery had come to grant relief against forfeiture of land as a
matter of course. Any requirement of particular hardship or
extenuating circumstances had been dropped. "The protection
accorded to mortgagors was viewed as one aspect of a general policy
of providing relief against penalties and forfeitures, and protecting
persons from the unconscionable enforcement of legal rights."6 That
phrase "unconscionable enforcement of legal rights" is important. In
the eighteenth century, the right to redeem was elevated to an
estate in land. Mortgagors and their heirs, regardless of common
law actions, had a perpetual right to redeem their land by paying off
the debt. The general theory accepted in chancery proposed that a
mortgage merely served as security for a loan, whatever its outward
form as a conveyance. Chancery greatly constricted the mortgagee's
rights. "In no branch of the law is the sanctity of agreement less
regarded. '7 It is vitally important to keep these principles and
attributes of equity in mind, because they clarify what several
prominent Upper-Canadian jurists probably had disliked about an
equitable jurisdiction for their colony.
In England, the interference of equity was also resented by
some, and there was an attempt made in 1653 to limit the right to
6 _AV.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
at 244.
7 kid. at 246.
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redeem to a period of one year after the forfeiture of the land at
common law. The ordinance did not survive the Restoration.
However, in a turnabout, mortgagees began to appeal to Chancery
to set limits on the right to redeem which otherwise were perpetual.
In effect, the chancery courts allowed mortgagees to bring an action
to foreclose the mortgagor's right to redeem. After a successful
action, the Courts would give notice to the mortgagor that, if he did
not exercise his right to redeem within a fixed period set by the
Court, he would find this right forever foreclosed. By the early
nineteenth century, this period was accepted as six months from the
date of the hearing of the case. Nevertheless, the mortgagor
retained a perpetual right to redeem unless the mortgagee took
steps to force the issue. Without a court of chancery, mortgagors
could not exercise their right of the equity of redemption, and
mortgagees could not foreclose.
However, by 1809, mortgagees had access to measures that
seemingly eliminated redemption altogether and yet gave them the
means to seize lands. By the early eighteenth century, a judgment
creditor could attempt to get satisfaction for a debt in arrears
through three writs. Fieri facias attached the debtor's chattels, and
levari facias his crops. Elegit gave the judgment creditors the right
to use half the debtors' lands until the debt had been satisfied.
Mortgages were an entirely separate form of obligation and will be
discussed shortly. None of the three writs seized and transferred
title to a landed estate. This limitation was set aside in the colonies
in 1732 by An act for the more easy recovery of debts in his Majesty's
plantations and colonies in America.9 Land became subject to
seizure by a writ of fieri facias. The 1732 Act applied to Quebec
after France had ceded it to England. Then, the Act would have
applied to Upper Canada too, as a part of old Quebec, except that
in 1792 the colony introduced the law of England relative to
property and civil rights °
8 Ibid at 241-47.
9 (U.K.), 5 Geo. 2, c. 7.
10 W.R. Riddell, "'Fi Fa' Lands in Upper Canada" (1929) 7 Can. Bar Rev. 448 at 448-
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Of course, the law of England did not permit the seizure of
land by fier facias. In the confusion as to which law applied, the
half-century old colonial practice of having the sheriff seize and sell
lands was disputed. In 1798, the Court of King's Bench for Upper
Canada could not decide whether a motion for fier facias could be
issued for land. Only two judges had been present and they
disagreed. The next year, with three on the bench, the court upheld
that a fier/ facias could issue for goods, chattels, lands, and
tenements. An Act of 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 1, controlled the use of
the fier/ facias writ on lands, but the legality of the practice
remained in question until upheld by a Privy Council decision in
1809.11 One of the reasons that the English judges (Allcock and
Thorpe) who came to the colony were perturbed about the absence
of chancery, and raised the matter with the colonial office, was that
the fied facias method for securing land had not been confirmed.
As well, Thorpe did not approve of it, for he could not see how
such a writ could apply to land held in freehold.12
Although a short account of a complicated matter, two
assertions are relevant to the chancery question. First, Upper
Canadian creditors had sought to work in a new world tradition of
law that had upset the protection granted to English creditors.
Second, creditors had acquired a preference for the fier/facias and
managed to get it firmly installed by 1809. These observations will
help to clarify why an absence of a court of chancery essentially
failed to hobble creditors, for their counsel knew well how to work
the common law and its colonial variants to get the most out of a
system of law that excluded equity. But the complicated tale does
not end here. Careful barristers working for nervous mortgagees
eventually took precautions assuming that equity slumbered and
could awake at any time to wreak havoc on the land market.
The peculiar condition of Upper Canadian civil law imposed
no real hardship on mortgagees after 1809. It truly disadvantaged
mortgagors. In the strictest sense, these terms did not quite apply
in every case, because what vendors got from buyers was not always
11 Ibid. at 451.
12 Letter from Allcock to Sir George Shee (14 March 1806) reprinted in Report on
Canadian Archives [1892], xiv.
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a true mortgage but a bond - an instrument under which the debtor
agreed to pay a stated sum on or before a specified day. If the
conditions of the bond were not met, the creditor could use a fiei
facias to secure lands. Thus, in these circumstances in Upper
Canada, mortgagees could enforce a good possessory title to the
mortgagor's land by an action of ejectment. If the mortgagor failed
to come forward with the principal, interest, and costs, the
mortgagee would get possession and practically the same result at
law as if he had foreclosed in equity. Some protection was granted
the mortgagor, though arguably not as much as he would have had
with an equitable jurisdiction. In the estimation of Falconbridge,
"the possible difference [was] that he [the mortgagee] got a speedier
remedy than he would have got in equity 13 - an advantage to
mortgagees in these circumstances. Other mortgagees had lent
money on the security of land and they used the same procedures
for recovery. It is not clear to me that both types of mortgagees
were in the same situation, but in either case mortgagors were at a
disadvantage as they could not exercise the right of redemption.
Clearly, if a true mortgage had been negotiated, the ejectment
process retained one worrisome problem for the mortgagee. Some
mortgagees felt that all of English law extended to the colony
despite the lack of a court for equity. Therefore, all that was
required to bring equity into operation was a court which would
permit dispossessed mortgagors to reclaim their former estates by
exercising the then perpetual right of the equity of redemption.
For mortgagees, the puzzle was to find a means to pre-empt
any right of redemption or, in other words, a way to foreclose. The
trick was to do this without admitting that mortgagors had a latent
right to redeem. Not surprisingly, they found a solution by recourse
to the colonial creditor's friend, the fi fa. Basically, a mortgagee
treated the equity of redemption as an estate in land, and had the
court issue a writ of fier facias for a sheriff's sale of the land and
the equity of redemption. The sale of the latter had no foundation
in law because the equity of redemption could not be dealt with by
13 J.D. Falconbridge, The Law of Mortgages of Land (Toronto: Canada Law Book
Company, 1942) 58.
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a common law action.1 4 However, should equity have been stirred
to life, the procedure could have been used as evidence to
strengthen a mortgagee's claim to an absolute title. More
immediately, the compliance of court officers in executing writs,
legally valid or not, was intimidating.
It is being too gentle on mortgagees to describe their
conduct as neutrally as did Falconbridge in 1914. Falconbridge
portrayed the mortgagees as "perplexed ... to give [their] title[s] the
sanction of some judicial proceeding. 15 True, they had a problem,
but it arose from the convenience of two colonial expedients devised
to speed and secure recovery. They were perplexed only to erase
all risk and attain a position greatly superior to that condoned under
English law. If mortgagees were perplexed it was merely because,
like most people, they wanted to have their cake and eat it too.
The point of the law, as completed by equity, was to prevent this if
such ambition tread upon the weal of petty proprietors. The failure
to establish a court of chancery provided a convenience to men of
landed capital; the men who held large estates and partitioned them
for farmers or town dwellers. It cannot be proven that at first this
advantage was planned, any more than it can be proven that equity
was kept out because of its poor repute in England. However, from
sources from the 1820s, exclusion by design henceforth becomes a
likelihood, and one of the central figures in the exclusion was John
Beverley Robinson.
By the time that Robinson occupied positions from which he
could influence the anomalous equity situation - first as Attorney
General (1818-1829) and then as Chief Justice (1829-1862) -
expediency was in the saddle. It was vain to insist, as he would, that
equity had no substance. The expedient of treating the putative
equity of redemption as real property gave equity a de facto
standing; the 1792 Act likely had given it a de jure basis. Despite
these inconvenient facts, Robinson would deny that equity had a
trace in the legal life of the colony. Among other things, he would
allege that if equity were accorded any weight it would harm men
14 R.W. Turner, The Equity of Redemption: Its Nature and Connection with Equitable
Estates Generally (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931) at 161.
15 Falconbridge, supra, note 13 at 59.
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who had entered into agreements under the assumption that
equitable forms were not in the colony. Later we will see that such
men were not so unaware of equity, and that Robinson had personal
and "ideological" motives for resisting the jurisdiction.
II. JOHN BEVERLEY ROBINSON'S DISAPPROVAL OF
EQUITY
In 1818, the colony had a new Lieutenant-Governor,
Peregine Maitland, and a new Attorney-General, John Beverley
Robinson. Almost from the beginning of their association, they
dealt with the matter of chancery, but they did so tepidly. Maitland
seems to have been the more actively concerned. On 12 May 1828,
Robinson wrote an account of his involvement with the chancery
issue as he recalled it. He believed that it had engaged Maitland's
attention for many years, but that his own involvement had begun
in 1822. Robinson thought that he might have been instructed by
Maitland to discuss the Court with the Colonial Office during his
mission to secure more revenue from the duties collected by Lower
Canada. On that occasion, Robinson found himself busy working
against a projected union of the two colonies. He claimed that he
could not recall whether he had raised the subject of equity
6
Robinson returned to London in 1825, instructed by
Maitland to discuss government concerns. The topics covered the
great political issues of the day: the clergy reserves, alien natura-
lization, trade with the United States, and revenue. One instruction
dealt with an area of chancery. Maitland wished to know whether
he could alter letters patent fraudulently obtained; in other words,
act to remedy the common law.17 He may have gone further in his
verbal instructions, for Robinson recollected that he was to mention
the chancery issue if the occasion were to arise.1 Patrick Brode,
16 Letter from 3.B. Robinson to Maitland (12 May 1828) CO 42 (microfilm copy at the
Archives of Ontario), vol. 385 at 234-44.
17 Letter from Maitland to Robinson, Memoranda (22 April 1825) CO 42, vol. 375 at
109-14.
18 Letter from Robinson to Maitland (12 May 1828) CO 42, vol. 385 at 234-44.
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Robinson's biographer, ascribed to him a more active role, but
supplied no documentation. "In 1825, during his discussions with
Bathurst, Robinson again raised the issue of the province's desperate
need for a chancery court.''9 The account strikes me as misleading,
for it represents Robinson as the persistent advocate of something
which he opposed from time to time. The Attorney-General was
himself modest in his 1828 report, more so than his biographer. He
thought he might have spoken to the Colonial Secretary.
If, as we can demonstrate on later occasions, Robinson
disapproved of major features of equity, then he was in a position
to deftly undermine it. A member of the assembly since 1821, he
knew that most members from all factions favoured applying
revenues to internal improvements and that the reformers were
critical of expenditures on official salaries. While Robinson may
have been unclear about whether chancery had been discussed with
him at the Colonial Office, he had made inquires about the salary
necessary to attract a barrister to Canada to set up a Court of
Chancery, and returned with the figure of £2000 per annum. In his
1828 recapitulation, Robinson noted that the legislature of 1826 had
pledged to look into an equitable jurisdiction. It had done nothing,
he surmised, because it found the costs, which he had supplied, too
great. There is nothing to suggest that Robinson was rueful about
the outcome.
20
The assembly's parsimony provoked the judiciary. Believing
themselves overburdened, the judges forwarded a memorial to the
Colonial Office in July 1826. Noting the Lower-Canadian bench had
eleven judges, they appealed for an augmentation of the Upper-
Canadian establishment.21 Robinson's discussions of 1825 and this
request of 1826 conceivably had moved London toward a resolution.
However, instead of a successful conclusion, the matter of the
Upper-Canadian courts collapsed into a notorious muddle. On 9
April 1827, Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, sent Maitland a
19 P. Brode, Sir John Beverley Robinson: Bone and Sinew of the Compact (Toronto:
Osgoode Society, 1984) at 149.
20 ibid.
21 The Memorial of the Chief Justice and the Judges of His Majesty's Court of King's
Bench in Said Province, CO 42, volume 378 at 10-12.
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dispatch dealing with the memorial, approving the appointment of an
additional judge and wondering about "an enlargement of their
jurisdiction":
I understand that at present there is no Tribunal in the Country discharging the
functions of a Court of Equity, and that there is consequently a failure of justice
in those numerous and most important cases which belong exclusively to courts of
that nature.
22
Bathurst advised that a separate court was not required.
One of the judges of King's Bench could assume the duties under
the title of Master of the Rolls or Vice-Chancellor. Further, he
authorized the allocation of sufficient Crown revenue to support the
addition of a judge, and advised that if such revenue cut into other
projects, these should be postponed. His remark would have had
the potential to stir a hornets' nest for he was ordering the colony's
priorities in a way that was sure to antagonize the reformers in the
assembly if it had to legislate a new court. But would the prickly
legislators have to be brought into the picture? In closing, Bathurst
alluded to a constitutional matter that seemed innocent enough. He
was not sure what was required to appoint a new judge.
I am not indeed aware, that anything further would be requisite than the usual
warrant under the Sign Manual to appoint another Judge, and I may probably be
able to shortly communicate to you, that such an appointment has been made. But
you will consult the Law Officers of the Crown in the Province, respecting the
necessity of obtaining an Act of the Legislature, or of issuing Letters Patent under
the Great Seal in order to render the proposed increase to the number of Judges
legal and effectual.
2 3
Within a week, Bathurst was out of office.
The constitutional sensitivity expressed as an afterthought
was not misplaced, but the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Goderich,
appears to have neglected it when pressed for an appointment by a
persistent "place seeker" and equity authority. John Walpole Willis,
who pestered Goderich, was led to believe that he would receive a
commission for an Equity judgeship in Upper Canada. He also
assumed that his salary would begin on 14 July, the day he accepted
22 Letter from Lord Bathurst to Maitland (9 April 1827) reprinted in A. Doughty & N.
Story, eds, Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, vol. 3 (Ottawa: King's
Printer, 1935) at 367-68.
23 bid.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the undertaking from the Colonial Office. Worried that the season
for crossing the Atlantic with a family was fast closing, Willis insisted
on departing before the question of how he would be appointed as
an Equity judge had been settled. He departed with an
appointment as a puisne judge of the Court of King's Bench and
believed that he soon would have a Chancery patent as well.24
Goderich's letter of introduction, addressed to Maitland, did
spell out larger plans made for Willis.
It has been in contemplation to make provision for the administration in Upper
Canada of that part of the Law of England which in this Country is administered
as the Court of Chancery, and it is intended to commit that jurisdiction to Mr.
Willis who has practised for several years in the Courts of Equity.
25
Goderich alluded to some difficulties that had "delayed the execution
of this purpose." The loose ends of the constitutional matters had
not been tied up. Within a year, the haste, laxity, and home
government's insistence on certain details had stirred up a mighty
imbroglio. Willis was to be denied an Equity commission. A genius
in a fury, he easily unpacked the skeletons in the colony's judicial
closet.
Willis was sworn in as puisne judge of the Court of the
King's Bench on 11 October 1827. Under the impression that an
equitable jurisdiction would be established soon, he set about to
draft a plan for a full court. Anyone alert to the assembly's outlook
on costs for official positions would have acted more modestly than
Willis. Willis interpreted his promised commission as implying a
separate court. His draft proposal for a court, dated 24 October
1827, must have gone to Maitland and it seems likely that the
arrogant Willis would have circulated his ideas further. There is no
proof of his having aired his designs for a court around the little
colonial capital, but it is entirely possible that both his memorandum
on chancery and another on the establishment of Canadian Baronets
made the rounds during November and December. If they had,
24 Letter from W.D. Willis, Minister of Trinity Church Bath, to W. Huskisson (6 May
1828) CO 42, vol. 386 at 311-12; letter from J.W. Willis to Goderich (12 July 1827) CO 42,
vol. 382 at 333.
25 Letter from Lord Goderich to Maitland (19 July 1827) reprinted in Documents
Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, vol. 3, supra, note 22 at 369.
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then the twin opposition to a court - from Robinson and from the
reform group in the assembly - is quite explicable. To the
Canadian-born jurists in a small society, Willis's grand schemes would
have piqued jealousy and suspicion. To reformers, his plans would
have embodied the evil of men of the long robes seeking to elevate
themselves at public expense. After the court scheme had been
defeated in March 1828, the dynamics changed and the reformers
employed Willis's knowledge and anger to expose the judicial sins of
the judiciary.
Willis intended that a Canadian court of chancery would
replicate fully the forms evolved in England. It would have afforded
relief in cases of accident and mistake, and in matters of account
including mortgage transactions. It also would have dealt with fraud,
specific performance of agreements, the execution of trusts, and the
protection of the property of infants. The care of estates of "idiots
and lunatics" had been a specially delegated authority from the
Crown and it too would have been introduced. Most duties would
have been rare in the lightly settled colony, but mortgages were an
area of considerable potential business. Prime business activities, the
selling of land and the finance of sales, generated many disputes.
To conduct chancery work, Willis proposed English-style
offices. To start with, he wanted "a suitable provision for the Judge
and a proper place for performing the duties of the office."26 He
emphasized that the handling of monies belonging to suitors of the
court, a matter of "delicacy and importance," required the services of
an accountant general whose office should be connected with no
others. Willis also required a Master in Chancery who would take
depositions. The English Court of Chancery took written statements
and ordinarily did not take viva voce evidence. Willis claimed that
a proper court needed a Registrar "whose business it [would] be to
attend the Court and enter minutes of proceedings and deliver out
the orders and decrees." To file "as of Record all proceedings of
the Court," Willis felt that his establishment required a Clerk of the
Crown in Chancery. The judge, of course, had to have a Secretary
to receive petitions and documents. To ensure decorum and order,
2 6 Memorandum by John Walpole Willis, 24 October 1827, Upper Canada Sundries
(microfilm copy in Archives of Ontario), 46944 - 47.
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Willis recommended the appointment of a Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms
or Tipstaff and Usher. He conceded that the latter positions might
be combined. All of the above, he allowed, "will be sufficient for
the foundation of the Court." Willis never had an opportunity to
press this model with the advantage of a Crown commission. He
had drafted the memorandum on October 24; on December 25, he
learned that the English Crown law officers had agreed that an
Upper Canadian Court of Chancery required colonial legislation.
Not surprisingly, when the Lieutenant-Governor canvassed his law
officers and Judges of King's Bench for their views on such
legislation, Willis recommended a second separate Court
establishment.27  To the ambitious Robinson, the younger man
posed a multiple threat. He might have his own Court with offices
and status; his wife was the daughter of an aristocrat; he had the
training and erudition to embarrass others and he was proposing a
new social ranking.
The dispatch that Maitland received from the Colonial Office
- advising that the Crown should not commission Willis, but rather
that the colony should proceed by legislation - provoked a
constitutional issue. The opinions of the English Crown Law
Officers were outlined by the new Colonial Secretary, William
Huskisson, in a dispatch of 25 November 1827 and they made things
very complicated. The officers had doubted whether the Crown
could create a new Judge in Equity for the colony, without the
intervention of Parliament or the colonial legislature. Lord
Goderich had made the point that equity was to have been Willis'
jurisdiction, but the officers took direct exception.
The Law Officers of the Crown have further suggested whether instead of erecting
a distinct and independent Tribunal, it might not be expedient to invest the existing
Common Law Court with so much of an equitable jurisdiction as upon due
consideration may be thought useful or necessary to the Province, and they observe
that this jurisdiction might be exercised as in the Court of Exchequer in England
in the same Tribunal, and by the same judges who administer the common law.yJ
27 Essay on the Creation of Canadian Baronets by Judge Willis [1827], Upper Canada
Sundries, 47558-60.
28 Letter from Huskisson to Maitland (25 November 1827) reprinted in Documents
Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, vol. 3, supra, note 22 at 370. Letter from
J. Scarlett and N.C. Tindal to Huskisson (25 September 1827) CO 42, vol. 382 at 72-74.
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Huskisson's dispatch had more to say. He advised Maitland
to get the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals, and the
judges of Upper Canada on how best to establish an equitable
jurisdiction. When establishing a new tribunal or imparting new
powers to an existing tribunal, the colonial government was
instructed to frame the act so as to involve the Crown and
accomplish the purposes of the Act. "For the principle that all
Courts are Courts of the King, and that justice is to be dispensed
only by Officers commissioned by the King for that purpose, cannot
be too fully recognized, or too strictly enforced. 29 This instruction
to involve the Crown raised the hackles of the reform dominated
assembly. Ultimately, the question of judges' tenure and account-
ability sidetracked the effort to legislate a Court in 1828.
Maitland complied with directions and called upon the
Crown's law officers, the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, as
well as the three judges of King's Bench, including Willis, to
comment formally on the chancery issue. The official letters, drafted
in early February, came in time to prepare the government for the
forthcoming parliamentary session. Willis' report stressed the
necessity of, and legal precedents for, a separation of equity and
common law; he did not elaborate here upon details for the court's
establishment. Solicitor-General H.J. Boulton likewise favoured a
court of chancery apart from the Courts of common law, but his
was an equivocal advocacy. If the state of the colony did not
require the distinctive mechanism, then Boulton would have been
satisfied with a Court of King's Bench whose members were granted
specific equitable powers. Judge Levius P. Sherwood and Chief
Justice William Campbell flatly recommended that all judges in the
Court of King's Bench should also be judges in equity. They took
issue with Willis' argument for a separation of equity and common
law, and they alleged that the two branches of English justice were
not founded upon discordant or incompatible principles. "Equity is
29 Letter from Huskisson to Maitland (25 November 1827), supra, note 28.
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the soul and spirit of all laws."30 In seeking to undermine Willis,
they had either made the case for the law embracing equity or had
demonstrated their shallow comprehension of what equity involved.
If Willis had inflated equity, the brief by Campbell and
Sherwood had conflated it. Mind you, the home government had
just done the same. Goderich had spoken of a distinct jurisdiction;
the Crown Law Officers wrote about a combined tribunal. Still, in
the brief by the two Canadian judges, there was an over-statement
about the similarity between equity and common law. Possibly, the
pair was informed by learned English commentary. More probably,
they scarcely could have supported a separate jurisdiction because of
Willis, and, possibly they knew of his design for a full-fledged court.
Whatever the shape, a new separate court meant a drain on prestige
and a blow to pride. Sherwood, moreover, had another reason for
not wishing to lose control of an equitable jurisdiction; his name
floated in the odour of scandal. Sherwood had been co-purchaser
of the Chaudi~re Falls mill site at a sheriffs sale in 1820. The
acquisition became a celebrated instance of how the absence of an
equitable jurisdiction permitted exploitation of the poor by the rich
and cunning (although the victim in this case was actually a sharp
operator too). Notwithstanding the character of the alleged victim,
a court of chancery could have reconsidered exactly such a case.
In subsequent months, Willis would tangle with the Sherwoods
whom he came to detest as contemptible manipulators of the law.
31
Robinson's brief goes a long way in substantiating the
suspicion that he had an aversion to equity. It also provides a
sample of his independence of mind and his brilliance. Robinson
attacked the idea of a court of chancery in an argument that
assumed Upper Canada to be such a distinctive society that to
introduce the full measure of English law would constitute an
inappropriate, in fact damaging, imposition. Besides, he felt, some
chancery proceedings were continued in England "principally from a
30 The reports to Maitland were printed in the journal of the assembly. See Upper
Canada, House of Assembly, Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 4th Session 9th Parliament at
57-61.
31 P. Romney, Mr Attorney: The Attorney-General for Ontario in Court, Cabinet, and
Legislature 1791-1899 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1986). Letter from Willis to Sherwood (1
March 1828) Upper Canada Sundries, 48243-44.
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necessity which the very exercise of such powers has itself
contributed to create."32 In other words, if an equitable jurisdiction
were not created, many of its functions would not be needed; once
created, need would follow and reformation would become difficult.
Were it not for the fact that Robinson's smooth reasoning ignored
the possibility that equity truly existed in Upper Canada, and only its
tribunal did not, he would have had a case. Instead, in later years,
he insisted that equity had not entered the colony until 1834.
Robinson also claimed to want to define and confer
jurisdiction rather than have to set boundaries after an equitable
jurisdiction had been erected. He wrote that he preferred specific
enactments. The whole machinery of the English system, he
observed, had been thought by some to have been more complicated
than even an advanced state like England itself had required. On
the surface, Robinson argued like those reformers whose few
surviving remarks about chancery prior to 1837 criticized its
legendary slowness and complexity. While reformers also favoured
remedies by specific enactments, they supported several in 1834 that
Robinson would decry. Robinson really could not abide equity by
statute, and beneath his brief there was a perception of property
rights distinct from that of the reformers.
Robinson probably most disliked the right of the equity of
redemption; this proposition will be developed later. Without this
specific complaint, there are still grounds for seeing Robinson's
position on property rights as being at odds with the reformers. To
suggest, as he did, that English law was more complicated than
necessary hints at Robinson's alignment with the eighteen-century
aristocracy's movement against the old order of law and property
rights. In March, when Robinson and the reform-dominated
assembly buried the opportunity to create a court of chancery, they
acted for different reasons: the former, because common law
standing alone met simple needs adequate for a society of decent
gentlemen of land or capital; the latter, because equity attained
through a court smacked of more opportunity for the administrative
and juridical elite whose members glided from government to bench.
32 Letter from Robinson to Maitland (15 February 1828) reprinted in Journal of the
Legislative Assembly, 4th Session 9th Parliament, supra, note 30 at 59.
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Perhaps the lineage and the intent of chancery were enough
to set Robinson's teeth on edge. However, this issue seemed to go
beyond a mere vision of society. Robinson, more than the other
jurists who registered doubts about the need for a court of chancery,
also had career-related reasons to argue against and to defeat Willis,
the brilliant, ambitious, well-connected, and arrogant interloper. He
recognized a rival. In 1841, looking back to this period, Robinson
admitted that an increase in the chief justice's salary had enticed
him. Earlier, he might have found the bench a sacrifice, for he
claimed to have had a rewarding practice. Around 1828, he
evidently felt "no anxiety to be CJ."' 3 After the affair had blown
over and Willis had been dismissed, the Lieutenant Governor filed
his report and included an allegation that Willis had set his sights on
the Chief Justice's seat.3 4 It must have occurred to Robinson that
Willis - a distinguished barrister with influence in the metropolis -
would have been a candidate for the position soon to open. In any
event, the Attorney-General, with the support of the Solicitor-
General, had been active early in 1828 cutting the ground out from
under Willis. They had written to Maitland on 29 January denying
the legality of having Willis take on equity cases with a commission
as a puisne judge of King's Bench.35 The 1794 Act establishing that
Court had not allowed for an equitable jurisdiction. To have
granted Willis special duties on that bench, they asserted, violated
the Act. This opening shot over the question of how the Court of
King's Bench had been organized in Upper Canada could help to
explain why, in May and June of 1828, Willis would find that the
practice of allowing a vacant seat on the bench had jeopardized
justice in Upper Canada. Two could play the game of narrowly
reading an act.
3 6
Letter from J.B. Robinson to Sir G. Arthur (28 September 1841) reprinted in G.R.
Saunders, ed., The Arthur Papers, Being the Papers Mainly Confidential, Pivate and Dcmi-
Official of Sir George Arthur, vol. 3 (Toronto: Toronto Public Library and the University of
Toronto Press, 1959) at 461.
34 Letter from Maitland to Huskisson (6 July 1828) CO 42, vol. 385 at 194-232.
35 Letter from Robinson and Bolton to Major Hillier [secretary to Maitland] (29 January
1828) CO 42, vol. 385 at 18-20.
36 Letter from Willis to Maitland (30 May 1828) CO 42, volume 385 at 7-8.
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Willis discovered, as the basis for a technical argument, that
the practice of having but two judges on the bench violated the Act
and produced deadlocks which permitted the miscarriage of justice.
On 16 June, he addressed the court, presenting a long and tightly
argued case for the illegality of many proceedings by the King's
Bench since 1794. Undoubtedly, a clash between two ambitious men
who could see themselves as Chief Justice inspired some of the
juridical sniping that created political excitement in 1828. This
interpretation of the Willis affair is firmly entrenched in the
historiography. The baronetcy proposal, the draft scheme for a
court establishment, and several additional observations to follow
flesh out the basis for the personal animosity interpretation.
From the tone of letters written by Willis and his aristocratic
wife, it is not difficult to understand how personalities poisoned a
serious debate over the structure of courts which was ultimately a
controversy about the make-up of the law and about property
rights. 7  When the dispatch which denied him a Crown patent
arrived, Willis turned nasty and demanding. Influence, connections,
and self-promotion were blatantly expressed. On the day after he
received word that he would not receive the commission, he wrote
to Maitland about the matter and his brother's comments upon it.
He let the Lieutenant-Governor know that his brother had been in
correspondence with Mr. Stephen at the Colonial Office. James
Stephen had written that "your Brother's Patent must stand still until
we can persuade the worthies on the other side of the world [the
government of Upper Canada] to assist us." The letter by Willis was
both hectoring and condescending. He consequently concluded:
"My Brother adds the consoling reflexion that my salary is going
on."38
After Maitland had removed Willis from the bench on 26
June, the judge's wife opened an aggressive campaign to get the
dismissal reconsidered. She threatened to use her influence at
home. During the months from March to June, Willis had
37Letter from Lady M. Willis to Maitland (n.d. probably 25 June 1828; 28 July 1828)
Upper Canada Sundries.
38 Letter from Willis to Maitland (26 December 1827) Upper Canada Sundries at 47455-
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consorted with reform politicians, subscribed to "disreputable"
journals and collected information on assorted juridical scandals that
had ended favourably for the colonial elite. In Maitland's
estimation, "he was not superior to the temptations which
circumstances had unfortunately thrown in his way," and could be
found "hanging about the lobbies and committee rooms of the
House 39 when parliament was in session. Even allowing for the
fact that Maitland wrote these lines in justification for removing
Willis, it seems likely that an embittered Willis had thrust himself
into the political melee in order to strike back at his juridical
enemies. The unfortunate part of this indictment is that it evades
the importance of the property rights issue which also separated
Robinson and Willis.
Robinson opposed Willis for many reasons. One of them
was that he disliked aspects of equity. As we shall see, Robinson
spoke in favour of an equitable jurisdiction in 1837, but he did so
then because legislation already had awakened equity from its forty
year slumber. As a brilliant lawyer with a social affinity for
gentlemen of capital, Robinson appreciated the implications of
equity. When studying law in England, he had heard the Master of
the Rolls dispose of chancery petitions and had attended the Court
of Chancery.40 He surely discerned what a court of chancery could
do to property rights in Upper Canada. Unlike Sherwood's possible
fears in this regard, Robinson's stemmed not from likely self-interest
or fear of further controversy, but from a social philosophy
antithetical to an important dimension of equity. Specifically, he
disapproved of the right of equity of redemption. As we have seen,
the equity of redemption essentially granted to defaulting mortgagors
a perpetual right to reclaim their real estate. So long as common
law alone functioned in Upper Canada, the debtor tied by bond or
the true mortgagor had no effective basis for redemption.
It is true that Robinson's disapproval of this right is not
something he flatly stated in 1828. In his letter to Maitland on 15
February 1828, Robinson noted that the introduction of an equitable
Letter from Maitland to Huskisson (6 July 1828) CO 42, vol. 385 at 84-86.
40 Major-General C.W. Robinson, Life of Sir John Beverley Robinson Bart, C.B., D.C.L.,
Chief Justice of Upper Canada (Toronto: Morang and Co., 1904) at 81-82.
[yoi- 28 No. 4
While Equity Slumbered
jurisdiction would affect contracts which had not anticipated such a
result at the time they were drawn. This assumption has appeal but,
as we shall see, it was a weak claim. Upper Canadians had been
anticipating equity. Robinson cited mortgages as an example of
where contract problems might arise, although he failed to elaborate.
Later, in the same critique of chancery, he wrote that "our
transactions are more simple in their nature, particularly as respects
the disposition of estates, than in England."41 What did he have in
mind when he wrote these oblique passages?
English real estate transactions were more varied than those
in Upper Canada, and presumably Robinson felt a rationalized legal
system was in order. However, he was not one to rationalize for
the sake of rationalization; for example, he does not appear to have
used his position in the assembly to simplify criminal law. It was
Willis who first decried the backwardness of colonial law and
pointed to recent improvements in England. Robinson later
accepted modest reformation of capital punishment.
III. JOHN BEVERLEY ROBINSON AS THE MORTGAGEE'S
FRIEND
What Robinson meant by simplifying the law was, specifically,
the elimination of the equity of redemption. A complicated
judgment by Robinson in 1846 provides clues to this interpretation.
In Simpson v. Smyth,42 he offered reasons for disliking the equity of
redemption and for his ironic embrace of a court of chancery to
control that right. In December 1810, Thomas Smyth, who was
seised in fee simple of lots 1 and 2 in the 4th concession of Elmsley
Township, mortgaged this estate to Joseph Sewall. The mortgage
came due in December 1811, but Smyth did not pay. Quite possibly
the recourse to a writ of fier facias for the land and the equity of
redemption had not yet been widely practised by lawyers in the
colony and, since Sewall could not foreclose because there was no
equitable jurisdiction, Smyth continued to occupy the estate.
41 Supra, note 32.
42 (1846) 1 E. & A. 9, 172, 2 0.S. 162.
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Another probability is that the mortgagee had no interest in the wild
lands and continued to hope for a cash settlement. By 1825, when
the equity of redemption fier facias practice was surely well-known,
Sewall sued and got a writ issued for a sheriff's sale. It is essential
to note that the taking of Smyth's land and "interests" could have
been motivated by speculative calculations, because the Rideau
Canal project had been announced and the land would become the
townsite of Smiths Falls. The matter is pertinent; if true, then the
justification for a fi fa was considerably more than the defensible
purpose of recovering debt and interest. I
Charles Jones bought the lands and the equity of redemption
at the sheriffs sale in 1827 and sold them to James Simpson and a
partner. Simpson, a canal contractor, and his partner sold the
property and equity of redemption in 1832 to William Simpson for
£5000. Here, then, was an unusual circumstance, for if the
mortgagor's heir (a son of Smyth) could recover by payment of a
modest debt he would have a windfall and the purchasers would be
denied a great profit. But was that unfair if all parties knew that
the fier/facias action to acquire the equity of redemption had been
dubious? And what about the taking of the land not for debt
recovery but for extraordinary speculative gains? Here was some-
thing that equity was meant to redress. Smyth's heir tried to regain
the estate in 1836 by common law procedure of ejectment. It failed.
In November 1840, under the terms of an 1834 Act, he filed to
redeem. In July 1841, a decision in chancery supported him.
Simpson reopened the case by bringing in other purchasers of the
estate. The case failed and was appealed in June 1845.43 On first
argument, the Court of Appeal split evenly, but upon reconsidera-
tion of Robinson's position, which denied that Smyth's heir could
redeem, J.B. Macaulay reversed in favour of the plaintiffs.
The purpose of examining Simpson v. Smyth is to establish
probable grounds for Robinson's forestalling of equity from around
1822 to 1828, and for his dazzling switch to a support of an
equitable jurisdiction in 1837. One of the first questions in the case
was whether or not an equity of redemption of an estate could be
sold under a common law process. Was the colonial practice
43 The Upper Canada Jurist, vol. 2 (1846-48) (Toronto: Henry Rousell, 1848) at 130-
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legitimate? The equity of redemption was most certainly not an
estate that could be attached by a common law writ, but that was
what mortgagees had been doing to protect themselves while equity
slumbered. Robinson correctly maintained that such conduct was an
absurdity; he also remained adamant that equity simply could not
have existed prior to 1834. Therefore, the mortgagor of an estate,
after conveyance had become complete following a failure to
perform a covenant of the mortgage contract, could have had no
further interest in it and mortgagees should not have bothered
themselves with a negatory practice.
44
It had not been so simple. The mortgagee's improper
expedient arose from a reasonable expectation that equity waited in
the wings to spring on stage. Robinson went on to declaim against
the 1834 Act which stirred up (or, as he would allege, created)
equity. He suggested that meddlesome people who "had no concern
themselves in such transactions"45 had pressed for equity so that
mortgagors could move for redemption. Because these parties, he
continued, really failed to understand the decency of mortgagees,
they sought something superfluous to Upper Canadian conditions.
In effect, Robinson claimed that an old and venerable protection for
property holders who borrowed or who bought mortgaged lands
could have been dispensed with since mortgagees, in Robinson's
world, were categorically decent gentlemen. Robinson among them.
It would be interesting to know what had been the nature of
Robinson's law practice in the 1820s, the one which he had alleged
kept him in such comfort that the bench would have meant a
material loss. Had Robinson, prior to 1829, been involved in the
real estate market and in mortgage brokerage? Certainly by the
mid-1840s if not earlier, the Chief Justice had become a money
lender and a property vendor. In 1844, he had put out at least
£1800 in five loans. He also had employed an agent to sell lots at
Holland Landing and to collect on at least twenty-five more
mortgages there.46 In Simpson v. Smyth, he alleged that there were
44 Supra, note 42 at 41-42.
45 The Upper Canada Jurist, note 43 at 175.
46 See assorted bonds in the Robinson papers and letters from Robinson to George
Lount (18 July 1844; 4 December 1844) John Beverley Robinson Papers, Archives of Ontario.
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not many cases where the mortgagee would refuse money and try to
keep the estate. Partly, he averred, they would do this because of
decency but also because many lands had little value and mortgagees
wanted the money. In any event, mortgagees did not have to be
forced to behave correctly or even generously!47 Perhaps, Robinson
had himself in mind. He cited an undocumented instance where the
mortgagee had stood aside, though twenty years had passed and
property values had soared, and had allowed the mortgagor to pay
and reclaim the estate. The heirs of Smyth had found no such
liberality. Like his arguments in Toronto v. Bowes,48 Robinson
basically was affirming that men of capital could be excused from
the full constraints of the law, for otherwise nothing could be
accomplished.49 But he also seems to have been claiming that men
of capital behaved honourably.
The next stage in Robinson's argument addressed circum-
stances once equity stirred. It struck him as unfair that mortgagees
having spent money to secure writs of fieri facias for land and equity
of redemption, the latter to get better terms for dealing with the
mortgagor, could now be faced with the mortgagor still properly
exercising the right of redemption. Mortgagees had panicked and
behaved foolishly, but, he cautioned after this slap on the wrist, they
should not suffer materially. Even though Simpson, and Jones
before him, really had not acquired absolute title, for no one could
foreclose without an equitable jurisdiction, they had spent money
trying to do so. Additionally, he claimed that they had developed
the lands. Robinson smiled upon those men who had acquired the
lands. James Simpson was "an active zealous man, with capital at
command,"50 who had allegedly transformed wilderness into a hub of
commerce. It would be a shame to deprive ambitious men of
rewards for their manifold efforts.
47 The Upper Canada Jurist, supra, note 43 at 174.
48 (1834) 4 Gr. 489.
49 P. Romney, 'T'he Ten Thousand Pound Job: Political Corruption, Equitable
Jurisdiction, and Public Interest in Upper Canada, 1852-6" in D.H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the
History of Canadian Law, vol. 2 (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1983) 143 at 179-83.
50 Supra, note 42 at 79.
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Judge Macaulay took exception to the facts and the
implications of Robinson's characterization of the appellants.
Shrewdly, he proposed that too much of the rise in value was
ascribed to the developers. "[A] great deal more is due to the
Rideau Canal."51  He also dismissed Robinson's claim that
mortgagees would return land willingly upon repayment of a debt.
In the case before them, Smyth had lost his land in 1825 in order
for others to realize a speculative profit and the buyers of lands and
interests certainly would have rejected any offer of mere repayment.
An implication is that Robinson was stupid - or disingenuous.
Beyond Macaulay's questioning of Robinson's grip on reality, he had
reservations about the powers of the Court of Chancery.
Macaulay at first believed that the Upper Canadian court
could have no greater powers than the Court of Chancery in
England, but he later reversed his opinion and accepted Robinson's
reconstruction of events leading directly to the creation of the court.
In Robinson's account, the Legislative Council had been very
mindful of mortgagees' rights when it amended the Court of
Chancery Act in 1837. The committee of the Legislative Council
had manifested "a solicitude to favour or protect mortgagees, not
mortgagors, and the amendment was seemingly introduced and
adopted mainly with that view."52 The court had been empowered
"under certain circumstances" to refuse redemption. The equity of
redemption was not an interest in an estate, but a mere right to
pursue a remedy. Consequently, those who ruled on equity "[could]
not relieve [themselves] from the duty of exercising [their] best
judgment upon the reasonableness of allowing redemption at all."53
Robinson had not liked that "right to pursue a remedy." However,
after its reality had been reinforced by statue in 1834, he deemed a
Court of Chancery the best means to see to it that the right could
not damage the interests of men of capital, interests which he
shared.
51 Supra, note 42 at 103-5.
52 Supra, note 42 at 185.
53 The Upper Canada Jurist, supra, note 43 at 178.
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In sum, Robinson had a high opinion of men who developed
landed estates. As Philip Sworden and Peter George have demon-
strated, Robinson had not uniformly favoured industrial and
commercial capital in his decisions. He does not fit in every
instance the American model of a juridical instrumentalist.
Perhaps neither do American jurists. However, on the important
matter of smoothing out the land market, especially to quiet titles in
a period of dynamic development, Robinson darted about to assure
that, vendors, lenders, and men of capital who picked up lands at
sheriff's sales had protection against rights in equity.
Let us return to the winter of 1828. Robinson, as the
government's voice in the assembly, was charged by the colonial
executive with introducing the matter of equitable jurisdiction. From
what we have seen, that was entrusting a lamb to a wolf. There are
only two records of what transpired: the journal of the assembly,
and Robinson's reconstruction of the events. Robinson brought in
a resolution and a draft bill; he claimed to have wanted them passed
in sequence or at least to have had the first one passed. It was a
simple resolution that favoured the establishment of an equitable
jurisdiction. He later explained to Maitland that he wanted this to
pass first, before he put the bill, because he sensed that a debate on
details would sidetrack the question. Robinson's premonition proved
true. He showed a copy of a bill to John Rolph, the reform
spokesman most concerned with finding remedies to equity issues
through legislation rather than a court. As even Mackenzie had
insinuated several years before, Rolph disliked a court of chancery.
If Robinson had hoped to upset a court, he could have done no
better than to let Rolph get his teeth into details. Only a few days
before this episode, Rolph had moved, and Marshall Spring Bidwell
had seconded, an address to the Lieutenant-Governor to discover
who had signed Willis' letter of appointment. The reformers in the
assembly were very touchy about the appointment and tenure of
judges.SS
54 P. George & P. Sworden, "John Beverley Robinson and the Commercial Empire of
the St. Lawrence" (1988) 11 Research in Economic History 217 at 238.
55 Letter from Robinson to Maitland (12 May 1828) CO 42, vol. 385 at 234-44; Journal
of the Legislative Assembly, 4th Session 9th Assembly, supra, note 32 at 86, 100, 102.
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What reformers suspected was that the judge responsible for
equity would be answerable to the Crown. Huskisson had requested
as much. Immediately, the question of judges' commissions derailed
the equity debate and the assembly turned to the reformers' cause
of an independent judiciary. Later, a committee on equitable
jurisdiction drafted a resolution demanding that judges be
independent of the Crown and that the Chief Justice should be
excluded from the Executive Council, an old complaint raised anew.
In his post mortem on the affair, Robinson remarked too that "some
members were impressed with apprehensions of the delay and abuses
which in their minds seemed inescapable from a Court of Equity."
5 6
The bill died. Neither Robinson nor many reformers greatly
lamented this outcome; Robinson disliked both Willis and equity
while some reformers resisted a costly new court and the framing of
judicial commissions to make judges' tenure contingent on the
pleasure of the Crown.
IV. THE AWAKENING OF EQUITY, 1832 - 1837
The equity issue could not vanish in the mayhem of
tangential issues. It was too important and not all members of the
juridical elite had Robinson's vision of the law and society.
Solicitor-General Christopher Hagerman believed equity to be a
necessity. On 6 November 1832, he moved that the assembly strike
a select committee on chancery.57 By then, the government had
accepted the principle that judges should be granted commissions on
good behaviour. With the issue of an independent judiciary resolved
to the reformers' satisfaction, nothing extraneous could upset a
discussion purely about an equitable jurisdiction. However, it is
likely that a good many reformers still had misgivings about a court,
given chancery's reputation for devouring the estates of those who
used it. In addition to Hagerman, the committee consisted of
Marshall Spring Bidwell, John Willson, and William Morris, all
5 6 Ibid.
57 Upper Canada, House of Assembly, Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 3rd Session
11th Parliament at 11.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
intelligent and independent men. They reported on 23 December
1832, listing familiar gaps in the law. When they turned to
mortgages, they hit upon the problem faced by mortgagors and did
not mention an alleged difficulty facing mortgagees, the presumed
problem stressed by later commentators. As men familiar with the
operations of the law, they knew that the inability to foreclose
inflicted no hardship when mortgagors could not redeem.
There are at present no means of redeeming mortgaged estates, after forfeiture and
judgment in ejectment, and the possession charged under a writ of possession -
thus a person who, from inability or any accidental cause, has omitted to pay a
trifling sum secured by mortgage on property of great value, at the day it became
due, is without the means of reclaiming this property, althouh he may offer to pay
the money owed by him, and may indemnify the mortgagee.
8
The committee reported against merging equity into the Court of
King's Bench, recommended appointing five court officers, and
remarked that costs should not be held against an important
undertaking. A draft bill attached to the report got through a
second reading on 4 February 1833. On 7 February, it went into a
committee of the whole for detailed discussion. Quite likely the bill
had encountered the opposition of the more radical reformers who
believed a new court presented a costly remedy to specific legal
lacunae. In any event, further discussions by the committee of the
whole were precluded by resolutions proposing the expulsion of
William Lyon Mackenzie from the assembly. The session ended
before the bill could be passed.59
During the next session of Parliament, a chancery bill was
not re-introduced. There is no apparent explanation for what the
legislature chose to do instead. Somehow both a moderate assembly
and the legislative council agreed to introduce the right to the
equity of redemption by legislation rather than by court
establishment. Perhaps moderate practical men merely wanted to
start to tidy up mortgage law. In any event, two acts affected
mortgages. The first act assented to in 1834 dealt with many points
58 "Report to the House of Assembly, on the Subject of the Establishment of a Court
of Chancery in this Province, with a Draft of a Bill for that Purpose," Appendices to the
Journal of the House of Assembly, 3rd Session 11th Parliament, ibid. at 79.
5 9 Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 3rd Session 11th Parliament, ibid at 18, 66, 77, 119,
900 [VOL 28 No. 4
While Equity Slumbered
of property law and was styled An act to amend the Law respecting
Real Property, and to render the proceedings for recovering possession
thereof in certain cases, less difficult and expensive. One of the
proceedings for recovery was the exercise of the right of the equity
of redemption. In England, unless the mortgagee barred the
mortgagor by foreclosing on the right of redemption through an
action in chancery, the mortgagor could redeem at any time.
Indeed, heirs could redeem. In Upper Canada, up to 1834, neither
redemption nor foreclosure was possible. However, imitating
English revisions, 4 Will. 4, c. 1 inserted one important restriction
on redemption. It barred the mortgagor from attempting to redeem
beyond twenty years "from the time when the mortgagee took
possession, or from the last written acknowledgment." In itself, this
passage is peculiar for it limited a procedure without also
establishing that procedure. Nothing else in the Act dealt with
redemption.
It is probable that those who drafted the bill considered its
provisions as part of a series of measures concurrently under review.
Knowing they were about to stir up equity of redemption, they set
limits on it beforehand. The legislation that directly introduced
redemption, 4 Will. 4, c. 16, was assented to on 6 March 1834 as
was 4 Will. 4, c. 1. The former act, An Act concerning the Release
of Mortgages, observed that the common law would not permit the
reconveyance of the original estate of a mortgagor even if he would
perform the conditions of the mortgage after the date of default.
Equity had allowed such a reconveyance; a mortgagor could redeem
at any time on payment of principal, interest, and costs. The Act in
question stated that a certificate of payment would release the
mortgage and reconvey the original estate, but the prior Act had
limited the mortgagor's right to exercise redemption to twenty years
and had asserted that nothing in that Act could interfere with "any
Rule or Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity." As pointed out earlier,
Robinson apparently abhorred these Acts for having stirred equity.
The partial reawakening of equity seems to have provided
Upper Canada with another extraordinary situation regarding
mortgages. To a large extent, mortgagors could now redeem. The
countervailing right of mortgagees to force mortgagors to act quickly
or to lose the right was not granted. The right to initiate
foreclosure could not exist without an equitable jurisdiction and
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foreclosure - not withstanding the fieri facias expedient - was the
sole means by which mortgagees under English law could make their
titles absolute. They had to bring an action in chancery for
foreclosure. The Court would set a further date for payment of the
money due. As mentioned earlier, a six month period of grace was
usual. If the money were not paid by the new date, the property
would belong to the mortgagee. The Acts of 1834 showed that a
remedy by statute could threaten to grant to one side an inflexible
advantage. Conceivably, the legislators attempted to redress this by
the twenty year limit and through an amendment, provided in 4
Will. 4, c. 16, proposed by the Legislative Council. The amendment
held that a certificate of redemption "if given after the expiration of
the period within which the Mortgagor had a right in equity to
redeem, shall not have the effect of defeating any Title other than
a Title remaining vested in the Mortgagee, or his Heirs, Executors
or, Administrators." Apparently, after twenty years, a mortgagor and
mortgagee could agree to a settlement of their old accounts, but the
mortgagor could claim his land only if it were still in the hands of
the mortgagee or his heirs. If a third party had purchased the land
from the mortgagee who had occupied it, then the third party's title
was secure.
After March 1834, equity no longer slumbered, but the
statutes had not completed the process and property law was about
as muddled as before. Mortgagors could redeem; mortgagees could
not foreclose but could sell recovered estates and the new purchaser
would have a clear title. A court of chancery, therefore, came as
a measure to aid mortgagees. After heavy losses in the election of
1836, the reformers were more than ever out of the picture and
could not block a court. Creditor interests wanted a foreclosure
process. They may also have detected that, while chancery still
recognized mortgagors' rights and could grant the practical benefit
of six months to try to redeem even after a successful foreclosure
petition, chancery could also find circumstances in which to delay
foreclosure for six months would harm the mortgagee. Mortgagees
and those supportive of their interests might have seen in the court
a swifter process. Chancery had permitted the evil of mortgagors'
rights; however, unless the status quo ante 1834 could be recreated,
the court presented the best hopes for mortgagee interests. For the
government to extinguish the newly legislated right of redemption
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would have been very awkward. It had been one thing to ignore
equity. However, the awareness of equity had become too strong.
Striking it down also might not have been acceptable to the home
government which, after all, had been reproachful of the colony's
lack of a court of chancery.
The assembly brought a chancery bill up to the legislative
council on 9 February 1837. On 15 February, that body referred it
to a select committee with power to send for persons and papers,
and to report.60 Therefore, almost nine years after the colony's
juridical establishment initially had been requested for opinions on
chancery, it was again canvassed. Now, however, it had to respond
to the select committee's set of specific questions and of the five
who wrote in 1827 only Robinson and Sherwood remained.
Sherwood, who had opposed the court in 1828, supported it
in 1837. He could scarcely admit that a court was needed to hedge
in the 1834 legislation, although he was candid enough about his
disapproval of legal devices which favoured debtors. Essentially,
Sherwood claimed, for the record, that the colony now required the
court because of the increase in commerce and real property
business. At first glance, this sounds reasonable, but it implies that,
in his eyes, a branch of law was needed merely because of the
volume of business and not because of the attributes of justice it
conveyed. With regard to the right of the equity of redemption,
Sherwood maintained a hard line. He insisted that the sale of the
lands of a debtor under a writ of fieri facias should make the
purchaser the owner of the equity of redemption. It is important to
restate what this meant. Sherwood was insisting on speedy
foreclosure which actually violated the whole intent - the whole
history - of the right of equity of redemption. This observation
certainly raises doubts about the quality of justice dispensed by this
worthy. But Sherwood was consistent. He had not budged from his
1828 stance that the principles of equity and common law were
nearly allied. He wrote now that "a thorough knowledge of the
latter must necessarily include a knowledge of the former in all its
60 Upper Canada, House of Assembly, Journal of the Legislative Council of Upper Canada,
1st Session of the 13t1 Parliament at 115.
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essential parts."61 Of course, equity and common law were not quite
so married, but was this statement, like that of 1828, an unintended
admission that the law meant the common law and equity?
Sherwood's brother on the bench, LB. Macaulay, professed
neutrality on the question of a court. He wrote that either the
King's Bench or a Court of Chancery would do. The court for him
was not as important as the content of equity. As had happened
more times in Canadian history than national myth-makers would
like, a man of influence had turned south for a model. Macaulay
favoured codification of equity and looked upon a New York law
as a product of experience. He portrayed the legality of sales of the
equity of redemption under a writ of fieri facias as "a floating
question." He was wrong, but not intransigent. He observed that
New York had prohibited the practice.62 Attorney-General Robert
S. Jameson contributed little. Along with all, save Sherwood, he
correctly acknowledged equity as something quite apart from
common law. To have added it to the Court of King's Bench struck
him as a remedy making an "incongruous union of jurisdictions."
63
William Lyon Mackenzie, who during exile and while in politics once
again in the 1850s amassed files of arguments against chancery,
alleged that the 1837 establishment of the Court was a job done to
advance Jameson and create a vacancy for Hagerman. 64 If true, the
Attorney-General rationalized, but did so accurately. Most likely, as
an English jurist with equity training, he spoke from conviction and
knowledge.
Solicitor-General Christopher Hagerman, who had attempted
to move a chancery bill through the assembly in 1834, came to the
point. Chancery constituted "a necessity that has long existed, and
is daily increasing."65 On the matter of the equity of redemption,
Hagerman contradicted Sherwood. He asserted that no mortgagor
61 Report of the Select Committee, Upon Chancery Establishment Bill" in Journal of the
Legislative Counci 1st Session 13th Parliament, ibid. at 81-82.
62Ibid at 84.
63 bi
64 J.D. Blackwell, 'Robert Sympson Jameson" 8 DCB.
65 Supra, note 58 at 87.
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should be deprived of equity of redemption. Even in the days
before equity's appearance in statutes, lenders ought to have
recognized that equity of redemption existed as a latent if not
imminent factor. A jurisdiction, he implied, could have been created
at any moment. "It is to be presumed that this right [the equity of
redemption] was well understood, and in contemplation of all parties
at the time of the execution of these securities."66 One wonders if
the same presumption was not also alive among colonial men of
capital in 1827 when Robinson fretted that chancery would
introduce a new factor unfairly into contracts. Upper Canada's
peculiar property laws, after all, had been commented upon by
Judge Thorpe in 1806 and surely had been known as problematic to
anyone who made a business of land sales and mortgage lending.
Hagerman's comments reveal him as consistent and astute on the
equity issue. The Upper Canadian judiciary was not a uniform and
intractable body and even one as prone to bluster as Hagerman
could shine.
67
Chief Justice Robinson's comments appeared first in the
report of the select committee. Once more Robinson had an
occasion to write at length on chancery. His apparent conversion
seems astonishing; he waxed eloquent in his support for a court of
chancery. Whereas Sherwood was stubborn and Jameson potentially
self-serving, Robinson could recognize a lost cause and discover new
stratagems for the maintenance of a socio-economic system. The
man who in 1827 had wished to curb equity before creating a Court
of Chancery now saw no reason for limiting cases - for example, by
a minimum sum involved in the suit. "There may be flagrant cases
of imposition or injustice under that amount, which should not go
without remedy, though the Common Law Court cannot reach
them."6 Had Robinson grown in wisdom? Perhaps. He had now
had eight years on the bench and had been required to deal with
cases where justice required equity, and to apply equity without
sound authority to do so. Had he become more secure as a Chief
66 Ibid.
67 For an appraisal of Hagerman see R.L. Fraser, "Christopher Alexander Hagerman"
7 DCB.
6S Supra, note 65 at 77.
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Justice with no sharp English chancery rivals in sight? Most likely.
Had the reawakening of equity in 1834 forced him to come to terms
with something he basically disliked? Absolutely. He could see that
a court of chancery could do no more damage to mortgagees'
interests than the 1834 Acts. Indeed, it could rein in mortgagors by
foreclosure and by the power to deny redemption. He did not state
this in so many words, but wrote, in a more general manner, that
Chancery's principles "are not arbitrary or dangerous, but sound and
well established, and are in advance of justice."69  The select
committee had asked directly whether a court of chancery should
be restrained from interfering with mortgaged estates in the
possession of mortgagees, assignees, or purchasers at Sheriffs sales
on the ground of equity of redemption. He saw no grounds for
restraining.
The Chief Justice intimated why a court was needed and
why it should not be limited. The 1834 Acts and even the 1837
chancery bill itself allowed mortgagors to exercise their power of
redemption retroactively, back 20 years in the 1834 legislation and
back 10 years in the 1837 Court Act. A dispossessed mortgagor
could pay off his old debt, exercising his right of redemption, and
regain his former estate. In a community where property values
remained static, the mortgagee, his heirs, and devisees would not
have suffered great loss. Presumably they would have benefitted
from occupancy, crops, or rents. Such economic benefits, however,
did not seem to satisfy the expectations of many participants in the
land market of Upper Canada. Here land had become a lively
commodity, not just a resource from which to extract a living over
the long term. Robinson clearly recognized this. In 1828, he had
claimed the colony was different from England. Now he repeated
the claim and added reasonable support. "Real estate, it is well
known, passes in this country very rapidly from owner to owner." In
the process, it would get improved; it could increase enormously in
value. Therefore, he could swallow the right of equity of
redemption, but only if something could be done to countervail it
and guarantee fairness to men of capital. Otherwise those men
might discover that estates which they considered as absolute and
69 Ibid. at 79.
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which had escalated in value no longer belonged to them. They
wanted certainty; a commodified land market with many turnovers
of parcels of real property required certainty of title. There could
be no general rule for fair treatment in these instances, claimed
Robinson. Thus, he preferred each case be tried on its own and
also that there be a proper appeal procedure.70 As we concluded
earlier, instrumentalism does apply to at least a certain area of
Robinson's thought.
A final detail from the briefs given to the select committee
deserves comment. English and continental justice had evolved
many differences. One distinction was that common law court
proceedings, being largely verbal, did not accumulate thick files of
depositions. The continental inquisitorial system did build up files,
much to the joy of historians. But chancery, with its roots in
petitions to the Crown, also assembled documents. The legendary
ponderousness of chancery owed much to the collection and
examination of depositions. Willis' 1827 plan had included a Master
in Chancery who would have handled matters requiring minute
investigations. The master would have functioned like the examiner
of witnesses in the English Home District who took depositions of
witnesses residing within forty miles of London. The juridical
experts in 1837 opposed the idea of written declarations in Upper
Canada. Hagerman voiced a familiar refrain against English
chancery and preferred verbal testimony, believing it would "be
found the least expensive and less likely to lead to prolonged
litigation."71 Typically, Robinson had more to say than the others
and produced interesting reasons for preferring viva voce evidence.
A searching cross examination often detects the intention to conceal or prevaricate,
and the demeanours of a witness aids much in giving satisfaction to the mind.
Besides, experience proves that depositions may be artfully drawn, so as to produce
a false impression, and yet screen the deponent from the guilt of perjury; and
many persons in the world, will subscribe to a written affidavit without much
scruple. It is best they should be made to tell their own story.
72
70 bid. at 78-79.
71 Ibid. at 81.
72 Ibid. at 78.
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Sherwood cited similar reasons. 73 The detail on verbal proceedings
contributes slightly to the general picture of colonial law as a
product of something other than mere imitation. In some cases, the
colony's leading juridical authorities ignored English law like the
right of equity of redemption; several even turned a blind eye to an
improper measure such as the use of fierifacias to seize and sell the
equity of redemption. They ignored English criminal justice reforms
for many years. Here, on the taking of evidence, they set out to
change a customary practice. Canadian law drew selectively from
the English well. This point is of some interest, although the real
challenge is to discover why. To claim concern for the environment
is superficial. Robinson, to give him credit, spelled out his reasons
for pursuing courses different from England, whether he was writing
against equity in 1828 or finding merit in the New York legislation
in 1837. These are inconvenient facts for anyone who believes that
"Robinson clung to English law and customs" or that "Upper Canada
welcomed British institutions and accepted the English rule of law
as the basis for freedom."74 Moreover, concern for the environment
scarcely does credit to Robinson's social attitudes and his reflections
on human nature. In sum, standard generalizations have problems.
An Act to Establish a Court of Chancery in this Province, 7
Will. 4, c. 2, established a jurisdiction and a court structure that
strongly resembled what John Walpole Willis had recommended.
First, as he had insisted, equity was not merged with the Court of
King's (Queen's) Bench; there was to be a judge known as "the
Vice-Chancellor of Upper Canada." Second, the powers were as
Willis had enumerated. The Court of Chancery would deal with
fraud, trusts, executors, mortgages, dower, infants, idiots, lunatics,
specific performance of agreements, and letters patent. Reformer
John Rolph found the court's power to compel the discovery of
concealed papers or evidence a threat to civil liberty.75 It may have
been inserted as a recognition of the fact that, in a period before
the compulsory registration of property instruments, Upper Canadian
73 Ibid. at 81.
74 George & Sworden, supra, note 50 at 237; Brode, supra, note 18 at 175.
75 Christian Guardian, 15 February 1837.
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estate cases involved privately held documentation. Nevertheless,
given the history of attacks on the freedom of expression in the
colony and the immediate disposition of many reformers to secretive
contact, the origin of the measure remains open to interpretation.
A third element of Willis' plan, a full complement of court officials,
was provided for in the Act. The government was to appoint a
registrar, two masters, an accountant, and a Sergeant-at-Arms. The
Act had several distinctive elements. It did provide for viva voce
proceedings and a Court of Appeals consisting of the Vice-
Chancellor, the Chief Justice, and the puisne judges. Mindful of the
basis for complaints about equity in England, the legislators charged
the Vice-Chancellor with defining process and rules of practice "to
facilitate the despatch of business and occasion the least expense."
There is no conclusive proof that the 1837 Act came about
because of the 1834 measures; however, internal evidence as well as
our analysis make this a plausible interpretation. Section XI of the
Act is the only one that spelled out a power that had been declared
in the list of jurisdictions in section II. The highlighted power
pertained to mortgages. It conferred upon the Vice-Chancellor the
authority to make orders and decrees in respect to foreclosure and
redemption "where before the passing of this Act the estate had
become absolute in law, by failure in performing the condition."
Whereas the equity of redemption had been denied for forty years
and then put in place by legislative formula, it was now fully alive
under the care of the Vice-Chancellor who could treat the rights
and claims of mortgagees and mortgagors as appeared to him to be
"just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case." It was
upon this section that the decision in Simpson v. Smyth would hinge.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
What can be learned from this labyrinthine sequence of
episodes in the history of Upper Canadian civil law? For one thing,
puzzling and difficult concepts or seemingly arcane disputed practices
should never be avoided, glossed over, or tackled by shortcuts when
they have raised passion as equity did. Complaints about a lack of
equity came from the only two judges - Thorpe and Willis - ever
dismissed from the Upper Canadian bench. This pair and other
English judges (Allcock and Jameson) understood equity as
supplementing common law. They understood it as necessarily part
of the law. We might want to set aside provincialism, the instinct
for dismissing English meddling, and admit that they properly
disputed half-baked local law. In the case of the dismissal of John
Walpole Willis, the chancery muddle precipitated a muckraking
review of colonial jurisprudence and a major political excitement
prior to an election. Then, too, in coming to appreciate the
significance of equity, there is the otherwise curious instance of
Mackenzie's work to defeat reforms to chancery, a successful
campaign that helped to precipitate the retirement of Robert
Baldwin from politics. Neither the attack nor Baldwin's reaction
were strange, given the background of the question. Little Mac had
come over to Rolph's position, especially after witnessing the nature
of the court established in 1837, and discovering, in exile, the
existence of European and American jurisdictions spared courts like
chancery. In 1851, he moved that chancery be abolished and equity
be served by the common law courts. Later in the century, the two
systems were combined.
The abstruse principles of equity seem complicated and odd;
in fact, though now obscure, they dealt with the definition of the
law and, among other things, with basic relations between creditors
and debtors. They compelled discussions which would not cease
even into our own age when legislation has revised mortgagor and
mortgagee rights from time to time. When the significance of
chancery is grasped, Upper Canada takes form as more than a
notoriously litigious community whose frontier circumstances led to
juridical forgetfulness or innovation. Those latter points are easily
said and vague. The litigation was not conducted with all the
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safeguards evolved by English law. Possibly, economics initially had
precluded an equitable jurisdiction. We will never know for certain
and that remains an unsatisfactory part of this reconstruction. In
any event, by the 1820s, the omission had grown into a convenience
- though ultimately a risky one - for men of landed wealth who
sold parcels of their estates or for men of credit and liquid assets
who lent capital for land purchases. The dimensions of this
convenience have yet to be explored; it can only be said now that
mortgagors were potentially disadvantaged. How many were
affected? How did the quirk in mortgage law specifically benefit
some of the wealthy landed and mercantile families of Upper
Canada? The precise answer will not come easily, but Henry Bolton
opined that the equity of redemption had been sold under a fi fa in
"numerous, perhaps hundreds of instances."76 The shifting demands
of a capitalist land market have shaped and re-shaped the mortgage
law of Ontario to the present, in a process which had begun during
the first decades of the society.
The chancery issue also pertains to hoary debates in Upper
Canadian history. Was there a family compact and, if so, what
united its members? The colony's pompous legal personalities make
any list of potential compact members. Their variety of statements
in 1828 and 1837 exposed individual ideas; these compact members
could split hairs brilliantly. Sherwood stands out as an obdurate and
dull defender of the status quo, while Robinson's shift in direction
to protect men of capital betrays significant instrumentalism.
Basically, however, most shared a colonial elite mentality. This
mentality was a bit less than an admiration for English law. They
liked their colonial pond. Robinson made the case for excepting the
colonies in 1828. In 1837, he revealed an awareness of New York
law and a preference for viva voce proceedings found in New York
though rare in England. We ought to expose loyalty to English law
to a critical analysis which assumes there are many traditions within
it. It is the way in which public figures selected and assembled the
parts, while invoking the name of the whole, that must concern
historians who also must keep in mind what was the law.
76 The Upper Canadian Jurist, supra, note 43 at 191.
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The tangled chancery question of the 1820s and 1830s finally
is partly amenable to the well-known reflections on English law
presented by E.P. Thompson in his conclusion to Whigs and Hunters.
However, Thompson meant the common law when he referred to
the law. In our presentation, the law has meant more than that.
But let us see how Thompsonian principles work. We can
document that in Upper Canada "the law can be seen to mediate
and to legitimize existent class relations."77 For example, the special
uses of a writ of fieri facias and the foot-dragging over an equitable
jurisdiction fit this generalization. It is worthwhile mentioning that
the erosion of limitations on common law writs which occurred in
the colonies, first generally in 1732 and then specifically in Upper
Canada by juridical action from 1794 to 1809, coincided with a phase
in English law when the aristocracy and gentry attempted to turn
the law to the service of those with property interests and against
those without. Neglecting the establishment of an equitable
jurisdiction can be seen in association with the eradication of
agrarian use-rights by enclosure acts in the home country. Both
"modernized" and both strengthened the position of men who
wanted to use wealth actively.
On the other hand, such men could not succeed in imposing
new laws and practices that would sweep away entirely older
definitions of property and property rights. Thompson maintained
that, though the elite might think the rules of law were a nuisance
to be overcome, such rules nevertheless existed. They were "a
legacy as substantial as any handed down from the struggles of the
seventeenth century to the eighteenth."78 Interestingly, the doctrines
of equity as they applied to the protection of mortgagors had been
challenged and then reinstated in the seventeenth century. Some of
Thompson's claims are dicey. "If the actuality of the laws' operation
in class-divided societies has, again and again, fallen short of its own
rhetoric of equity, yet the notion of the rule of the law is itself an
77 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (London: Allen
Lane, 1975) at 264.
78 Ibid at 265.
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unqualified good."79  It must be remembered that he meant the
common law and it was in the hands of the whig aristocracy. But
if we include equity within the definition of the law, then his
essential point is more tenable. The rule of the law, broadly but
soundly defined, is not simple and not readily extinguished.
In Upper Canada, when the rule of the law was allowed to
be less than what it was in England, knowledge of the law's
completeness created quandaries and anomalies that cried out for
remedy. Indeed, the indiscrete and supercilious John Walpole Willis
came into Upper Canada as a vessel of knowledge freighted with a
wealth of information about the historical and the contemporary
components of civil and criminal law. Quite likely he applied his
knowledge to expose colonial misconduct because of vindictiveness.
Reformers harnessed his bitterness and made use of his erudition.
And why not? The colonial juridical establishment had counten-
anced backwardness; it merited criticism by an erudite lawyer
steeped in equity. Shortly before his dramatic courtroom address of
16 June 1828, Willis had published in a United-States newspaper
notice of his intention to produce an account of Canadian
jurisprudence. He evidently attached a motto to the project:
Meliora Sperans.80  Hoping for something better was an
understandable ambition for an English jurist who had published two
treatises on equity.
Willis survived his dismissal by Maitland. The Secretary of
State for the Colonies declared in 1831, in respect to the events of
1828, that Willis' "personal honour and integrity were free from
reproach." He sat on the bench in British Guiana and New South
Wales. "Honest and fearless, and alert to prevent fraud and
oppression, but [lacking] the judicial temperament," Willis made
enemies in Australia and was sacked a second time by a colonial
governor. A Melbourne newspaper that had opposed him said,
upon his removal, "we like him the better that he has never
administered one kind of justice to the rich and another kind to the
79 Ibid at 267. For a critique of this position about the common law, see the review of
Whigs and Hunters by M.J. Horwitz in (1977) 86 Yale L.. 561-66.
80 Clipping enclosed in letter from Maitland to Huskisson (6 June 1828) CO 42, vol. 385
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poor."81  One wonders how Upper Canadian law would have
developed if Willis, rather than Jameson, had been its first chancery
judge. Indeed, what if Willis instead of Robinson, had been made
Chief Justice of Upper Canada?
81 "John Walpole Willis" in Australian Dictionary of Biography, 1788-1850, vol. 2,
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967).
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